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DESCRIPTION OF THE CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN FOR THE SSF PMAD DC TESTBED
Anastacio N. Baez and Greg L. Kimnach
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio 44135
ABSTRACT
NASA Lewis Research Center and Rockwell
International, Rocketdyne Division, are responsible
for the design, development, and testing of the
Space Station Freedom (SSF) Electrical Power
System (EPS). Tile SSF EPS has evolved from an
early baseline of a Hybrid Solar
Dynamic/Photovoltaic Power Generation with
20kHz AC power distribution system to a
Photovoltaic power generation with a DC power
distribution system. In order to help identify
technology risks and system level issues during this
EPS evolution, and during the design and
development phase, a supporting development
end-to-end Power Management and Distribution
(PMAD) DC testbed program has been initiated
and various phases completed. One of the testbed
program main objectives is to build a power system
testbed that will serve as the platform for the
evaluation of various power system control
techniques. These power system control techniques
have been developed based on high level EPS
system requirements and operating scenarios.
Because of the Space Station Program
Restructure that took place in November/December
1990, the allocation of control functions between
ground and on-orbit is being reassessed. However,
because of the maturity of the work, it was decided
to complete the original implementation of the
control system described in this paper. Efforts are
currently underway to adapt to this revised
allocation of functions.
The PMAD DC Testbed Control System has
been developed using a top down approach based
on classical control system and conventional
terrestrial power utilities design techniques. The
design methodology includes the development of a
testbed operating concept. This operating concept
describes the operation of the testbed under all
possible scenarios. A unique set of operating states
has been identified and a description of each state,
along with state transitions, was generated. Each
state is represented by a unique set of attributes and
constraints, and its description reflects the degree
of system security within which the power system
is operating. Using the testbed operating states
description, a functional design for the control
system was developed. This functional design
consists of a functional outline, a text description,
and a logical flowchart for all the major control
system functions.
The detail design phase consists of performing
functional decomposition and allocation of the
functional design, and generating detailed
flowcharts, or pseudo code, input/output
descriptions, timing and data format constraints,
and software implementation considerations. A
software implementation of the detail design
includes the generation of a Software Requirement
Specifications and a Software Development Plan.
This paper describes the control system design
techniques utilized, a brief description of the
various control system functions, and the status of
the design and implementation.
INTRODUCTION
The NASA LeRC DC PMAD Testbed is a
reduced scale representation of the EPS on the
SSF. The testbed program's main objective is to
support the identification of electrical power system
technology risks and system level issues during the
design and development phase of the SSF EPS.
In addition, the unique capabilities afforded by the
testbed will allow the evaluation of candidate power
system design concepts, and early prototypes of
space power components. System level issues like
end-to-end system stability, power system
protection, power system control, and subsystems
interactions, among others, are being evaluated in
the testbed. A complete description of the
development and evolution of power system
testbeds to support the Space Station Freedom
Program is found in reference I1].
In its final configuration, the PMAD Testbed
will consist of two DC power channels as shown
in Figure 1. Each power channel consists of a Solar
Array Sequential Shunt Unit (SSU), a DC
Switching Unit (DCSU), Battery Charge and
Discharge Units (BCDU), Battery Simulators, a
Main Bus Switching Unit (MBSU), DC to DC
Converter Units (DDCU), Secondary Power
Distribution Units (SPDU), Tertiary Power
Distribution Units (TPDU), and Load Converter
Units (LCU). A detailed description of the DC
Testbed architecture and all its major components
is found in reference [21 .
CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The SSF EPS, because it spans the entire SSF
structure,lends itself to a distributed control system
architecture. The DC testbed control system, in its
final configuration, will consist of eleven standard
controllers arranged in a distributed, hierarchical
architecture as shown in Figure 1. This hierarchical
control system provides the monitoring and control
functions for the testbed power system. The testbed
control system requirements are to continuously
monitor and determine the state of the testbed
electrical power system, and to periodically provide
its status to the Operator Interface System (OIS).
The control system design will augment power
system fault protection and provide manual and
automatic power component control.
The overall testbed operation is overseen by the
OIS. The OIS serves as the testbed operator
interface and provides some of the functions that
the Operations Management System (OMS) will
perform for the SSF EPS. The Power Management
Controller (PMC) is the highest level controller in
tile EPS, and serves as the overall EPS coordinator.
The PMC performs all high level functions
associated with the operation of a safe and robust
power system. The PMC coordinates the various
levels of the hierarchy; it receives high level
commands from the OIS and provides EPS status
information to the testbed operator.
The PMC coordinates the operation of the
control system subsidiary controllers. The lower
level controllers consist of Photovoltaic Controllers
(PVC) and Main Bus Controllers (MBC). The
PVCs provide monitoring and control functions to
the SSUs, BCDUs, and switchgear (Remote Bus
Isolators, RBIs) tl_at comprise the DCSU. The
M BCs monitor and control the operation of the
DDCUs and the RBIs that comprise the MBSUs.
A Load Management Controller (LMC) serves as
the secondary and tertiary power distribution
controller and coordinates the operation of the
Secondary Power Controllers (SPC) and Tertiary
Power Controllers (TPC). The SPCs control the
operation of the switchgear that comprises the
Secondary Power Distribution Units and the TPCs
control the operation of the switchgear that
comprises the Tertiary Power Distribution Units.
The secondary and tertiary switchgear consists of
RBIs and Remote Power Controllers (RPCs). The
LMC provides the PMC with secondary and tertiary
power distribution status information; although this
function is not currently in WP-04, it is needed to
demonstrate end-to-end operation of the testbed.
A hierarchical, functional breakdown of the control
system is shown in Figure 2. In this diagram, the
major functions associated with the different levels
of the architecture are shown allocated to the
various controllers.
The control system standard controllers are 20
MHz, Compaq 386/20e personal computers. Each
standard controller is configured with operating
software and the appropriate peripheral hardware
to perform its given function. The PMC provides
command and control data to the subsidiary
controllers via an 802.4 Token Bus, local area
network. The subsidiary controllers provide
command and control data to the testbed power
components via a MIL STD L553B Data Bus.
CONTROL SYSTEM STATES
The operation of the DC Testbed power system
can be represented using state space analysis and
conventional terrestrial utility power system design
techniques. A state transition diagram of the DC
testbed power system is shown in Figure 3. The
testbed power system is considered to have seven
operating states. Each state is described by a
unique set of attributes and constraints, and
characterizes the degree of system security within
which the power system is operating. The operating
states can be classified as being either MANUAL
or AUTOMATIC, based on the degree of operator
intervention that is required to operate the testbed.
The testbed is operating in the MANUAL mode
when the testbed operator is in complete contrQl
of the testbed components. The operator can
select a testbed configuration and can set testbed
component operating parameters to satisfy a
specific component or subsystem test. The
MANUAL mode of operation is unique to the
testbed and is being used extensively during
integration of the various elements of the testbed
and during evaluation of power system design
concepts.
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Figure 1 DC PMAD Test Bed Control System Block Diagram
The AUTOMATIC mode of operation is
characterized by the autonomous operation of the
testbed EPS. The functions that comprise the
AUTOMATIC mode of operation are designed to
maximize the degree of power system security.
System security is a function of the robustness and
efficiency with which the power system reacts to
disturbances. Power system disturbances include
overloading by the users and faults and failures
within the power system. Unlike a terrestrial utility
power system where loads can be turned on and off
without being scheduled, the SSF will have to
scheduled loads carefully due to limited power
source capacity. Consequently, the SSF will
require a highly autonomous EPS for maximum
power utilization. The functions that comprise each
of the AUTOMATIC states will consist of a
combination of power system hardware, and power
system control software and hardware. Scheduled
disturbances within the operating constraints are
dictated by a Short Term Plan (STP). The STP
is a time correlated load schedule that is provided
to the testbed control system by the OIS, and
represents the users load requirements as a function
of time.
The six autonomous states of operation are:
START-UP, SHUT-DOWN, NORMAL,
ALARM, EMERGENCY, and RESTORATIVE.
The Start-Up and Shut-Down states are unique to
the testbed and are considered for completeness in
the state space analysis. These states comprise the
necessary functions to perform an orderly and safe
start-up and shut-down of the testbed components.
The other four states are commonly found in utility
power system security monitor designs [5].
The NORMAL state of operation is
characterized by a high degree of system security.
The power system is operating in the NORMAL
state if the STP is being serviced autonomously, the
power distribution hardware is operating within
rated values, sufficient energy is available to satisfy
the users, and power system constraints are not
violated.
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Figure 2 Hierarchical Functional Breakdown
The ALARM state of operation is
characterized by a decrease in the system security
level. The power system monitoring function has
detected a contingency that decreases the operating
margins. Tile functions that comprise the ALARM
state are suited to try to remove the contingency
and return the power system to its NORMAL state
of operation. The ALARM state is not a secure
state and consequently the power system control
will try to transition the system to NORMAL state.
if these control functions fail, the system transitions
to the EMERGENCY state.
The EMERGENCY State of operation is
characterized by a drastic reduction of system
security. In this state the power system operating
has=be_ff:i_eques-ted. =:==ifi [fiis =_securdd state, the
operator will manually reset parameters in order to
transition the system to a more secure state. The
users- i0ad requirements in :the: STP-cannot be fully
met and system operating parameters are violated.
The -operator[ takes -t-he-fippr0pri_ite actibn-s to
transition the power system to the RESTORATIVE
state, in the testbed, the operator has the option
to shut-d0wn the testbed power system partially or
completely to avoid further damage. In the Space
Station Freedom the scenario will be slightly
different with the station management system taking
appropriate action to transition the system to a
secure state by either shutting down portions of the
power system or sending repair crews to fix the
problem.
The RESTORATIVE state is a transitional state
and its major function is to restore the power system
to a safe operating condition. The functions that
comprise this state are designed to transition the
power system to the NORMAL state. The power
system can transition back to the EMERGENCY
state, from which automatic sating again is
implemented. The ALARM, EMERGENCY, and
RESTORATIVE states of operation can be
collectively referred to as Off-NORMAL States.
CONTROL ALGORITHMS DESCRIPTION
The state diagram shown in Figure 3 represents
the operation of the i.estbed power sysiem. The
power system is composed ofth:ree e!emem_: the
power distribution sysieffi-15ardware, power Sysiem
control hardware, and the power system control
software. The functions that comprise each one of
the states deplci-ed in _he tes-tbed state diagram are
implemented by a combination of the three
i
1
elements described above [3]. The remainder of
this paper will address the functions being
implemented by the control system hardware and
software.
..... ....... _/ ......
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Table 1 lists the allocation of the major control
algorithms for the different states of the power
system. A complete functional design of the control
system algorithms that implements the state diagram
shown in Figure 3 has been completed at the NASA
LeRC. Each power system state is characterized
by a unique set of attributes, which can be
translated into functions that can be implemented
either as algorithms or hardware functions. All the
functions defined up until now can be classified
either as cyclic, or synchronous, or event driven.
A cyclic function is based on the periodic
occurrence of a task or a known disturbance. Event
driven functions are activated by the detection of
an unscheduled disturbance in the power system.
Most of the work completed at NASA LeRC has
been in the area of NORMAL state of operation.
The following is a detailed description of the major
functions that comprise the NORMAL state of
operation and provides an insight into the
specifications needed for software implementation.
The NORMAL State algorithms are classified
as either event driven or cyclic functions, and are
collectively referred to as NORMAL State
Processing. The cyclic functions include Short
Term Plan (STP) Implementation, System
Monitoring, and Off-NORMAL Detection. The
event driven functions include Operator Override
and Off-NORMAL Processing.
Optimal operation of the power distribution
system will require that:
(1) The control computers pre-approve user
loads for operation during specific time slots.
(2) The control computers accurately monitor
the power system.
(3) The control computers backup the hardware
protection schemes.
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Table 1 Functional Allocation
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SHORT TERM PLAN & SYSTEM INITIALIZATION
System Initialization can be defined as the
sequence of procedural calls which, based on
present system constraints and parameters,
determines the appropriate setpoints for the system
to operate in a NORMAL State during the
upcoming user demand cycle.
Unlike a terrestrial utility's load profile which
is statistically predicted, Space Station Freedom's
STP must be carefully planned and regulated due
to the limited energy availability. The STP defines
the load type, location, and the peak and nominal
requirements for users, batteries, and DDCUs. The
STP is created by the Operator Interface System,
using a default topology and ideal hardware
parameters, and is verified before the testbed is
"turned-on." However, the runtime conditions will
cause these parameters to change and preclude
certain topologies (e.g., sources available). Thus,
the objectives of STP Implementation, which is a
dynamic process, are to ensure energy availability
throughout the operating orbit, ensure safe
operation of the power distribution hardware,
accommodate changes in the distribution system's
runtime parameters (e.g., topology, line
parameters, DDCU efficiencies, actual energy
available), and adjust setpoints (e.g., battery
operation mode, source balancing, and hardware
trippoints).
Because the user loads are fed by DDCUs, each
channel of the testbed power distribution system is
broken into a primary and two subsidiary
distribution systems (Figure 1). This leads to three
initialization procedures: one for the PMC and two
for the LMC. The tool used to initialize the
subsystems is Load Flow [Ref. 6], because constant
power, current, and resistive loads are defined.
The LMC implements two STPs which define
the specific user loads (i.e., the loads connected to
tile Tertiary Power Distribution UnitsT. The PMC
implements an STP which characterizes the loading
of the DDCUs (as predicted by the LMC and
reflected to the primary distribution system).
Each subsystem initialization requires two load
flows. One is for nominal load requirements, and
the other for peak requirements. The objectives
of each are given below.
Nominal requirements must be analyzed to:
(17 Initialize the digital filters.
(2) Assure nominal operating voltages are
acceptable.
(3) Assure sufficient energy and power for
USerS.
(4 7 Assure that the steady state ratings of
hardware are not exceeded.
Peak demands are analyzed to:
(17 Set the "soft limits" on switchgear. These
are the maximum expected current flows and
minimum voltages, and serve as thresholds to set
Caution & Warning flags. The "soft limits" of
hardware are the expected maximum values, which
are below the ratings of a device.
(2) Determine the maximum energy and
power required from the sources.
(3) Seed the Power Interrupt Detection
algorithms.
Limited, predictive, autonomous,
batch-contingency analyses are implemented
whenever the present system setpoints and
topological parameters would result in an unsafe or
unacceptable operating point, Violations include
insufficient energy, over-stressed sources and
hardware, and unacceptable bus voltages.
Upon completion of an acceptable operating
point, the LMC and PMC send the results of their
respective initialization procedures to the subsidiary
controllers. The subsidiary controllers (MBC,
PVC, SPCs, and TPCs) control and monitoring
functions are then initialized, according to the load
flow results. The system is then ready to implement
the setpoints at the onset of the next demand period
and continue system monitoring.
SYNCHRONOUS SYSTEM MONITORING &
POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION
System Monitoring can be defined as the
process in which controllers periodically and
synchronously sample and collect sensor data,
smooth it, analyze it for acceptable system
performance, and prepare an appropriate message
for a control node, which implements the required
control function.
By definition, the power system must be
monitored for the following reasons:
(1) To ensure the safe operation of the system.
(2) To track energy consumption and storage.
(3) To verify locally detected power interrupts
and faults.
(4 7 To smooth data and update the Operator
Interface System with EPS operating parameters.
System Monitoring occurs at two levels. The
local processors (PVC, MBC, SPCs, and TPCs7
collect data synchronously, and the PMC
asynchronously receives the MBC and PVC data to
perform an asynchronous, but periodic, state
estimation (SET [Ref. 71.
Power system operating points, voltages and
currents, are sampled at a 10Hz rate in the testbed
[41. All sampled data is digitally filtered by a third
order, Butterworth algorithm, which smooths out
load modulations, reduces the effects of sample
skewing, and reduces the occurrences of "bad data
identification" by the SE. Data which is smoothed
by the Butterworth filter is referred to as prefiltered.
It should be stressed that the software
monitoring and protection schemes are intended to
be a backup to the hardware. As such, the response
times of the software are slower than the worst case
hardware times, but not so slow as to cause
continued, degraded or dangerous system
operation. An overview of the levels of backup is:
(l) At the tertiary distribution levels the
controllers implement undervoltage detection
(UVD), power interrupt detection (PID), and
overcurrent detection (OCD) algorithms.
(2) At the secondary distribution levels the
controllers provide backup protection to the
DDCUs and secondary subsystems. Thus, in
addition to UVD, OCD, and PID, bus and line hard
fault detection (HFD) are implemented. HFD is
implemented in the LMC because the TPCs and
SPCs do not have access to all required data.
(3) At the primary distribution level, the
software should provide backup protection for the
sources, roll rings, switchgear, and distribution
lines, and it should ensure energy availability.
Thus, UVD, PID, OCD, and HFD are all
implemented in the MBC and PVC. Furthermore,
SE is implemented in the PMC to detect "soft
faults" on lines and buses.
PID, which is resident in all subsidiary
controllers, uses two consecutive, unfiltered values
and a boolean expression (Eq. 1) to identify a
power interrupt condition in switchgear that is
expected to be closed (E=I) and carrying power.
Unfiltered values are used because fast action is
required. The required electrical values are voltage
and current. If the readings are greater than 60%
of the expected minimum values, then the logical
terms V and I are set to "1," else they are set to
"0." Also, switchgear provides the following
additional information: a relay status bit (l=ciosed,
0=open) and a trip bit (l=tripped, 0=not tripped).
The trip bit is used to indicate whether the PI is a
result of a local (T=I) or upstream (T=0) "fault."
Pl = E (Vk_/_-, + _-])k = present sample / Eq. 1
detection."
redundant (at
each bus, the
majority of
accuracies.
Under Voltage Detection uses prefiltered data
to identify bus voltages operating under q0% of the
expected minimum value, but over the 60% "power
interrupt value." Thus, this is "brownout
Furthermore, because there are
least two) voltage measurements at
UV condition is detected only if a
readings agree to within sensor
OCD scans the switchgear readings for currents
in excess of the expected peak values ("soft"
overcurrents) and over the device ratings ("hard"
overcurrents). Because caution & warnings or
preventative control should not be implemented
due to transients, OCD uses prefiltered data.
HFD (bus and line) is also performed in the
subsidiary controllers with prefiltered values, and
is referred to as "hard" because the level of faults
detectable is limited to values greater than
full-scale, sensor accuracies of the actual current
flow. (Thus if a line is carrying 100Amps, 5%
measurements can only detect faults greater than
approximately 5Amps.) The method used to detect
such faults is differential protection, which simply
requires that the sum of currents into a node equal
zero. Applied to measurements in the testbed, this
requirement translates to the generalized nodal
equation (Eq. 2).
l.O- Acc< _ input currents < 1.0 + Ace
1.0 + Acc g output currents 1.0-Ace
Acc= Measurement accuracy
Eq. 2
A description of the software implementation
of the above mentioned functions in the Ada
programming language is found in reference 141.
CONCLUSIONS
Unlike terrestrial utility power systems, the SSF
EPS will have to carefully schedule and monitor
loads, due to the limited available energy. The EPS
control system will play an important roll when
maximizing the use of electric power in the Space
Station Freedom. In its initial configuration, the
SSF EPS control system functionality will be kept
to a minimum to comply with program constraints.
As the SSF EPS evolves and becomes operational,
the EPS control system functionality is expected to
approach that of an autonomous electrical power
system. The SSF EPS control system functions will
be implemented on board the space station and in
the ground based control center. This paper has
presented power system control algorithms, being
implemented in the PMAD DC Testbed, that are
considered to be essential to the operation of an
autonomouselectrical power system. These
algorithmsarecandidatesfor implementationon
boardtheSpaceStationFreedom,or in theground
controlcenter.
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